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Abstract. Part I of this paper (IBPP, Vol. 1, No. 17) describes the conceptual problems inherent to
propaganda as process. Now Part II will describe the psychological rationale for why propaganda is
employed by governments and nonstate actors regardless of these problems.
(1) One might assume that governments and nonstate actors would not possess influence organizations
if these organizations did not serve a useful purpose. This useful purpose, however, may be reinforcing
the belief that one's fate can be controlled. In this regard, note that the absence of a belief in the ability
to control one's fate often is positively correlated with mental anguish and physical disease. If this
correlation is more than merely illusory, one can understand how governments and nonstate actors can
fund and perpetuate organizations which may not fulfill their stated charters. Members of these
organizations unconsciously prolong a delusion rather than confront too grim a reality.
(2) For just about anyone, some of one's predictions, attributions of causality, and assessments of
correlations seem accurate to some consensus of some other people. However, this accuracy may be no
more than the chance contiguity of one's cognitions with a real-world event similar to what was
thought, felt, or desired. Perhaps even the least adaptive of people are not masters of failure to the
extent that they defy the odds of chance contiguity. Even a Sad Sack perceives success in influencing
others on occasion. In the same way, one might believe that dreams can predict the future because a
dream may precede an event similar to it in waking life.
(3) This same phenomenon of chance contiguity seems to be based on variable ratio reinforcement
(VRR). With VRR reinforcement only has to occur occasionally and at no set time for us to believe we're
right more than occasionally. Research on learning suggests that phenomena based on VRR are so
resistant to extinction that--in this case--inflated perceptions of our ability to influence others can only
be deconditioned through unusual means. This resistance also characterizes superstitions and rituals
that ward off figments of our superstitions.
(4) Recognizing and acting upon an apparent inability to influence others--attempting to make a
convenient fiction inconvenient--"rock the boat." Keeping the boat from rocking becomes the way to
obtain an organization's perquisites, prizes, and promotions. It also advances the careers of those who
recognize the fiction but act as if fiction were fact. Psychopaths, careerists, and dependent personalities
can take heart. In fact, they may be failures at influencing others but have influence nevertheless.
In next week's IBPP Issue, the concluding third part of this article will contain pet delusions--possibly
adaptive--concerning the essence of propaganda and future implications. (See Ahn, W-K, & Bailenson, J.
(1996.) Causal attribution as a search for underlying mechanisms: An explanation of the conjunction
fallacy and the discounting principle. Cognitive Psychology, 31, 82-123; Johnson, J.T., Boyd, K.R., &
Magnani, P.S. (1994.) Causal reasoning in the attribution of rare and common events. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 229-242; Michael, M. (1991.) Some postmodern reflections on
social psychology. Theory and Psychology, 1, 203-221.) (Keywords: Information Warfare, Propaganda.)
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